






Competition Policy In Network Industries:  
An Introduction* 
 






We discuss issues of the application of antitrust law and regulatory rules to network 
industries.  In assessing the application of antitrust in network industries, we analyze a 
number of relevant features of network industries and the way in which antitrust law and 
regulatory rules can affect them.  These relevant features include (among others) network 
effects, market structure, market share and profits inequality, choice of technical 
standards, relationship between the number of active firms and social benefits, existence 
of market power, leveraging of market power in complementary markets, and innovation 
races.  We find that there are often significant differences on the effects of application of 
antitrust law in network and non-network industries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Network industries are a large part of the world economy.  A key network 
industry is telecommunications, providing voice and data services, including the Internet 
and the world wide web.  Another key network industry is computer software and 
hardware.  These two sectors, telecommunications and computers, have been the engines 
of fast growth of the world economy.  In the news and entertainment sector, network 
industries include broadcasting and cable television, which in recent years are reaching 
into traditional telecommunications services.  In transportation, networks include airlines, 
railroads, roads, and shipping, and the delivery services that “live” on these, such as the 
postal service and its competitors.   In the financial sector, networks include traditional 
financial exchanges for bonds, equities, and derivatives, clearing houses, B2B and B2C 
exchanges, credit and debit card networks, as well as automated transactions banking 
networks, such as ATM networks. 
 
Besides traditional network industries, many of the features of networks apply to 
virtual networks.  A virtual network is a collection of compatible goods that share a 
common technical platform.  For example, all VHS video players make up a virtual 
network.  Similarly, all computers running Windows 95 can be thought of as a virtual 
network.  Compatible computer software and hardware make up a network, and so do 
computer operating systems and compatible applications.  More generally, networks are 
composed of complementary components, so they also encompass wholesale and retail 
networks, as well as information networks and servers such as telephone yellow pages, 
Yahoo, Google, etc. 
 
Adding to the importance of networks from a public policy point of view is the 
fact that network industries often provide necessities.  Monopolization in such a setting 
can have significant social and political implications. 
 
There may be a number of anti-competitive concerns in a network industry.  The 
focus of this paper are the following questions: Since network industries have special 
common features, are there special competition policy issues arising out of key features 
of network industries?  If yes, what is the framework of the public policies that can be 
pursued to address these issues? 
 
 
2.  The Logic of Competition Law 
 
The logic of competition and antitrust law in the United States and the European 
Union is to guard against restrictions and impediments to competition that are not likely 
to be naturally corrected by competitive forces.  Although some disagree, I will posit that 
the maximization of efficiency (allocative, productive, and dynamic) is the desired 
  3outcome of competition and antitrust law, and that typically competition is the means of 
achieving efficiency. 
 
As an alternative to antitrust and competition law, economic regulation has been 
established in three exceptional case: (i) for those markets where it is clear that 
competition cannot be achieved by market forces; (ii) where deviation from efficiency is 
deemed socially desirable; and (iii) where the social and private benefits are clearly 
different.  In each of these cases, it is clear that a market without intervention will not 
result in the desired outcome.  In the first case, this is true by the definition of the 
category.  In the second case, markets may lead to efficiency, but society prefers a 
different outcome, and intervention is necessary to achieve this.  In the third case, 
maximization of social surplus does not coincide with maximization of the sum of profits 
and consumers’ surplus because of “externalities.” 
 
Some key network industries are regulated at least in part or in some aspects.  
Telecommunications has significant regulation at both the federal and state level.  
Railroads, electricity, air and ground transportation are also heavily regulated.  Financial 
exchanges are under “light” regulation and to a significant extent under self-regulation.  
In contrast, B2B exchanges, credit card, and banking networks, as well as computers and 
their virtual networks, are almost completely unregulated. 
 
A full discussion of the merits and problems with regulation of each of these 
network industries is impossible in the context of this brief article.  Instead, I will outline 
the parameters that would necessitate regulation or deregulation based on the broad 
features of network markets.  In a follow up paper, I will examine the full application of 
these principles in all network industries.  I expect to observe that the principles of 
economic regulation are not applied equally to all industries, and, in a number of cases, 
the present regulatory regime is based on historical reasons (political, social, and 
technological) and cannot be justified based on the application of the economic principles 
to the present technology. 
 
 
3.  Special Features of Markets with Network Effects 
3.1  Sources of Network Effects and the Reversal of the Law of Demand 
 
Many network industries exhibit increasing returns to scale in production: unit 
(average) cost decreases with increasing scale of production.  Often incremental cost is 
negligible (for example in software).  However, these are also features of non-network 
industries and are not the defining feature of network industries.  Thus, increasing returns 
to scale in production is also not the defining feature of the competition policy issues that 
are rooted in the existence of networks. 
 
Networks are composed of complementary nodes and links. The crucial defining 
feature of networks is the complementarity between the various nodes and links. A 
service delivered over a network requires the use of two or more network components.  
Thus, network components are complementary to each other.   
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A common and defining feature of network industries is the fact that they exhibit 
increasing returns to scale in consumption, commonly called network effects.  The 
existence of network externalities is the key reason for the importance, growth, and 
profitability of network industries and the “new economy.”  A market exhibits network 
effects (or network externalities) when the value to a buyer of an extra unit is higher 
when more units are sold, everything else being equal. 
 
Network effects arise because of complementarities.  In a traditional network, 
network externalities arise because a typical subscriber can reach more subscribers in a 
larger network.  See Figure 1, which depicts a traditional telecommunications network 
where customers A, B, …, G are connected to a switch at S.  Although goods “access to 
the switch” AS, BS, …, GS have the same industrial classification and traditional 
economics would classify them as substitutes, they are used as complements.  In 




Figure 1:  A star network 
 
In a virtual network, externalities arise because larger sales of components of type 
A induce larger availability of complementary components B1, ..., Bn, thereby increasing 
the value of components of type A.  See Figure 2.  The increased value of component A 
results in further positive feedback.  Despite the cycle of positive feedbacks, it is typically 
expected that the value of component A does not explode to infinity because the 
additional positive feedback is expected to decrease with increases in the size of the 
network.   
 
  5In traditional non-network industries, the willingness to pay for the last unit of a 
good decreases with the number of units sold.  This is called the law of demand, and is 
traditionally considered to hold for almost all goods.
 1  However, the existence of network 
effects implies that, as more units are sold, the willingness to pay for the last unit may be 
higher.  This means that for network goods, the fundamental law of demand is violated: 
for network goods, some portions of the curve demand can slope upwards.  This means 
that, for some portions of the demand curve, as sales expand, people are willing to pay 
more for the last unit.    
 
The law of demand is still correct if one disregards the effects of the expansion of 
sales on complementary goods.  But, as increased sales of a network good imply an 
expansion in the sales of complementary goods, the value of the last unit increases.  
Combining the traditional downward slopping effect with the positive effect due to 






Figure 2:  A virtual network of complementary goods 
 
The key reason for the appearance of network externalities is the complementarity 
between network components.  Depending on the network, the network effect may be 
direct or indirect.  When customers are identified with components, the externality is 
direct.  Consider for example a typical two-way network, such as the local telephone 
network of Figure 1.  In this n-nodes 2-way network, there are  2n(n - 1)  potential goods.  
An additional (n + 1th) customer provides direct externalities to all other customers in the 
                                                 
1  More precisely, the law of demand is true for normal goods, that is, for goods for which an 
increase in income leads to a higher quantity of sales.  If increases in income drove sales sharply down, the 
possibility of a Giffen good arises where sales increase as prices increase.  Giffen goods are truly 
exceptional and rarely observed. 
  6network by adding  2n  potential new goods through the provision of a complementary 
link (say ES) to the existing links.
2
 
In typical one-way networks, the network effect is only indirect.  When there are 
m varieties of component A and n varieties of component B as in Figure 2 (and all A-type 
goods are compatible with all of B-type), there are  mn  potential composite goods.  An 
extra customer yields indirect externalities to other customers, by increasing the demand 
for components of types A and B.  In the presence of economies of scale in production, 
the increase in demand may potentially increase the number of varieties of each 
component that are available in the market. 
 
Exchange networks (financial networks such as the NYSE and NASDAQ, 
commodities, futures, and options exchanges as well as business to business “B2B” 
exchanges) also exhibit indirect network externalities.  There are two ways in which these 
externalities arise.  First, externalities arise in the act of exchanging assets or goods.  
Second, externalities may arise in the array of vertically related services that compose a 
financial transaction.  These include the services of a broker, bringing the offer to the 
floor, matching the offer, etc.  The second type of externalities are similar to other 
vertically-related markets.  The first way in which externalities arise in financial markets 
is more important. 
 
The act of exchanging goods or assets brings together a trader who is willing to 
sell with a trader who is willing to buy.  The exchange brings together the two 
complementary goods, “willingness to sell at price p” (the “offer”) and “willingness to 
buy at price p” (the “counteroffer”) and creates a composite good, the “exchange 
transaction.”  The two original goods were complementary and each had no value without 
the other one.  Clearly, the availability of the counteroffer is critical for the exchange to 
occur.  Put in terms commonly used in Finance, minimal liquidity is necessary for the 
transaction to occur. 
 
Financial and business-to-business exchanges also exhibit positive size 
externalities in the sense that the increasing size (or thickness) of an exchange market 
increases the expected utility of all participants.  Higher participation of traders on both 
sides of the market (drawn from the same distribution) decreases the variance of the 
expected market price and increases the expected utility of risk-averse traders.  Ceteris 
paribus, higher liquidity increases traders’ utility.
3  Thus, financial exchange markets also 
exhibit network externalities.
4
                                                 
 
2   Besides the positive network effects described in detail in this paper, there is also the possibility of 
negative effects, such as congestion in transportation networks, or interference in radio, broadcast TV, and 
wireless telecommunications networks.   
 
3   See Economides and Siow (1988). 
 
4   The existence of network externalities in exchange markets is one of the reasons behind the 
proposal Economides-Schwartz to bunch orders and execute them at once in pre-defined times, thereby 
creating a call market concurrent with the continuous NYSE market.  See Economides and Schwartz 
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As we have noted earlier, network externalities arise out of the complementarity 
of different network pieces.  Thus, they arise naturally in both one- and two-way 
networks, as well as in vertically-related markets.  The value of good  X  increases as 
more of the complementary good  Y  is sold, and vice versa.  Thus, more of  Y  is sold as 
more  X  is sold.  It follows that the value of  X  increases as more of it is sold.  This 
positive feedback loop seems explosive, and indeed it would be, except for the inherent 
downward slope of the demand curve.   
 
To understand this better, consider a fulfilled expectations formulation of network 
externalities.  Let the willingness to pay for the  nth unit of the good when  n
e  units are 
expected to be sold be  p(n; n
e).  In this formulation, n and n
e are normalized so that they 
represent market coverage, ranging from 0 to 1, rather than absolute quantities.  
Willingness to pay p(n; n
e) is a decreasing function of its first argument because the 
demand slopes downward.  p(n; n
e)  increases in  n
e; this captures the network 
externalities effect, i.e., that the good is more valuable when the expected sales n
e are 
higher.  At a market equilibrium of the simple single-period world, expectations are 
fulfilled, n = n
e, thus defining the fulfilled expectations demand p(n, n). 
 
Figure 3 shows the construction of a typical fulfilled expectations demand in a 
network industry.  Each willingness-to-pay curve, p(n, ni
e), i = 1, 2, ..., shows the 
willingness to pay for a varying quantity  n, given an expectation of sales  n
e = ni
e.  At  n 
= ni
e, expectations are fulfilled and the point belongs to  p(n, n)  as  p(ni
e, ni
e).  Thus  p(n, 
n)  is constructed as a collection of points  p(ni
e, ni
e).  It is reasonable to impose the 
condition  limn→1 p(n, n) = 0.  This means that, as the market is more and more covered, 
eventually we reach consumers who are willing to pay very little for the good, despite the 
fact that they are able to reap very large network externalities.  It follows that  p(n, n)  is 
decreasing for large  n.  In Figure 3, the fulfilled expectations demand at quantity zero is  
p(0, 0) = 0. This means that consumers think that the good has negligible value when its 
sales (and network effect) are zero.  Although this is true for many network goods, some 
network goods have positive inherent value even at zero sales and no network effects.  If 
the good has an inherent value k, p(0, 0) = k, the fulfilled expectations demand curve in 
Figure 3 starts at (0, k). 
 
Economides and Himmelberg (1995) show that the fulfilled expectations demand 
is increasing for small  n  if either one of three conditions hold:   
 
(i)  the utility of every consumer in a network of zero size is zero; or 
(ii)  there are immediate and large external benefits to network expansion for very 
small networks; or 
(iii)  there are a significant number of high-willingness-to-pay consumers who are just 
indifferent on joining a network of approximately zero size.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995a).  A call market would have higher liquidity that continuous markets and could provide anonymity 
to large orders.  A survey of equity traders has established that most of them are willing to wait for 
execution of their orders in a call market.  See Economides and Schwartz (1995b). 
 




Figure 3:  The fulfilled expectations demand and critical mass 
 
 
The first condition is straightforward and applies directly to all two-way 
networks, such as the telecommunications and fax networks where the good has no value 
unless there is another user to connect to.  The other two conditions are a bit more subtle, 
but commonly observed in networks and vertically-related industries.  The second 
condition holds for networks where the addition of even few users increases the value of 
the network significantly.  A good example of this is a newsgroup on an obscure subject, 
where the addition of very few users starts a discussion and increases its value 
significantly.  The third condition is most common in software markets.  A software 
application has value to a user even if no one else uses it.  The addition of an extra user 
has a network benefit to other users (because they can share files or find trained workers 
in the specifics of the application), but this benefit is small.  However, when large 
numbers of users are added, the network benefit can be significant. 
 
 
  93.2  Critical Mass 
 
When the fulfilled expectations demand increases for small  n, we say that the 
network exhibits a positive critical mass under perfect competition.  This means that, if 
we imagine a constant marginal cost  c  decreasing as technology improves, the network 
will start at a positive and significant size  n
o  (corresponding to marginal cost  c
o).  For 
each smaller marginal cost, c < c
o, there are three network sizes consistent with marginal 
cost pricing: a zero size network; an unstable network size at the first intersection of the 
horizontal line through  c  with  p(n, n); and the Pareto optimal stable network size at the 
largest intersection of the horizontal line with  p(n, n).  The multiplicity of equilibria is a 
direct result of the coordination problem that arises naturally in the typical network 
externalities model.  In such a setting, it is natural to assume that the Pareto optimal 
network size will result. 
 
The existence of an upward slopping part of the demand curve and the 
multiplicity of equilibria even under perfect competition also allows for a network to start 
with a small size and then expand significantly. Suppose, for example, that marginal cost 
is at c < c
o and a new invention creates a new product with significant network effects. 
Then, it is possible that the industry starts at the left intersection of the horizontal at c 
with p(n, n) as expectations are originally low, and later on advances suddenly and 
quickly to the right intersection of the horizontal at c with p(n, n). Thus, the multiplicity 




3.3  Features of Markets with Network Effects 
3.3.1  Ability to Charge Prices on Both Sides of a Network 
 
There are a number of fundamental properties of network industries that arise out 
of the existence of network effects.   
 
  First, a firm can make money from either side of the network.  For example, a 
telecommunications services provider can charge subscribers when they originate calls or 
when they receive calls or for both.
5  When a network consists of software clients and 
                                                 
 
5   The pricing schemes used vary considerably depending on the telecommunications service.  
Traditionally, in fixed networks, in most places in the United States, local calls are free with a local 
connection that requires a fixed monthly fee.  Long distance subscribers were traditionally charged only for 
outgoing calls.  In the last three decades 800, 866, 877, 888–prefix “toll free” services allow for no charge 
to the calling party but impose a fee to the receiving party, while 900–prefix services allow the receiving 
party to charge a positive price to the initiator.  In wireless cellular and PCS telecommunications, in the 
United States subscribers pay for both incoming and outgoing calls, while in most of the rest of the world, 
wireless subscribers pay only for outgoing calls.  On the Internet, typically retail subscribers pay a flat fee 
irrespective of the amount of time they use the service, the number of bits exchanged, whether they are 
incoming or outgoing, and irrespective of the destination.  Similarly, Internet service providers buy 
backbone connectivity at rates that depend just on the size of the pipe they utilize and irrespective of 
utilization or whether they are incoming or outgoing, and of the destination. 
 
  10servers, both provided by the same firm, the firm can use the prices of the client and 
server software to maximize the network effect and its profits.  For example it can 
distribute the client software at marginal cost (free) and make all its profits from the 
server software.  In a similar vein, Adobe distributes the “Acrobat Reader” free while it 
makes its profits from the “Acrobat Distiller” product that allows the creation of files that 
can be read by the Acrobat Reader.  The availability of prices on both sides of the 
network allows for complex pricing strategies, and, depending on the dynamics and 
market shares on the two sides of the market, can be used strategically to enhance and 
leverage a firm’s strong strategic position on one side of the network.  Of course, this is 
not confined to high technology or software industries, and applies wherever 




3.3.2  Externalities Internalized or Not 
 
Second, in network industries, often the additional subscriber /user is not 
rewarded for the benefit that he/she brings to others by subscribing.  Hence typically 
there are “externalities,” i.e., benefits not fully intermediated by the market.  However, 
firms can use price discrimination to provide favorable terms to large users to maximize 
their network effect contribution to the market.  For example, a large customer in a 
financial market can be given a very low price to be compensated for the positive 




3.3.3  Fast Network Expansion 
 
Third, generally, the pace of market penetration (network expansion) is much 
faster in network industries than in non-network industries.  In the earlier discussion on 
critical mass, we saw that, in a one-period model, as unit cost decreases, the network 
starts with significant market coverage.  In the presence of frictions and not perfectly 
elastic supply, the network expansion is not instantaneous from 0 to n
o but rather is a 
rapid expansion following an S-shaped curve, as seen in Figure 4.  This figure compares 
the market share expansion of a new good (diffusion) in presence (delta = 1) and absence 
(delta = 0) of network effects as a function of time.  The self-reinforcing nature of 
network effects leads to a much faster expansion when they are present.
 8
 
                                                 
6   Low-tech examples are razors and blades and cameras and film. 
 
7   It is anecdotally known that Cantor Fitzgerald, which has a 70% market share in the secondary 
market for US government 30-year bonds, offered to Salomon (the largest “primary dealer” and trader of 
US bonds) prices equal to 1/10 to 1/5 of those charged to small traders.  This is consistent with profit 
maximization by Cantor Fitzgerald because of the liquidity (network effect) brought to the market by 
Salomon, which is by far the largest buyer (“primary dealer”) in the auctions of US government bonds. 
 
8   For a detailed discussion, see Economides and Himmelberg (1995). 
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Figure 4:  Equilibrium Diffusion with and without network effects 
 
 
3.3.4  Inequality of Market Shares and Profits 
 
Fourth, markets with strong network effects where firms can chose their own 
technical standards are “winner-take-most” markets.  In these markets, there is extreme 
market share and profits inequality.  The market share of the largest firm can easily be a 
multiple of the market share of the second largest, the second largest firm’s market share 
can be a multiple of the market share of the third, and so on.  This geometric sequence of 
market shares implies that, even for a small number of firms n, the n
th firm’s market share 
is tiny.   In equilibrium, there is extreme market share and profits inequality.
9
 
The reason for the inequality is straightforward.  A firm with a large market share 
has higher sales of complementary goods and therefore its good is more valuable to 
consumers.  This feeds back resulting in even higher sales.  Conversely, a firm with small 
market share has lower sales of complementary goods, and the feedback results in even 
lower sales.  However, the low sales firm is not necessarily driven out of business 
because that would require too low a price by the high sales firm.  In the absence of fixed 
costs, an infinite number of firms can survive, but there is tremendous inequality in 
market shares, prices, and profits among them.  Good examples of this market structure 
are the PC operating systems market and many software applications markets. 
 
To understand the extent of market share, price, and profits inequality in network 
industries, we provide results from Economides and Flyer (2000).  As a benchmark, they 
assume that all firms produce identical products, except for whatever quality is added to 
them by network externalities.  Also assume that no firm has any technical advantage in 
                                                 
9   If the distribution of the willingness to pay is distributed away from 0, an industry with network 
effects exhibits the finiteness property (Shaked and Sutton (1983)), with a finite maximum number of 
active firms despite all realizing strictly positive profits. 
 
  12production over any other with respect to any particular platform and that there are no 
production costs.  We consider here only the extreme case of “pure network goods” 
where there is no value to the good in the absence of network externalities.  The summary 
of the equilibria under total incompatibility (which can be enforced when firms have 
proprietary standards) is in the following tables.  Firm #1 has the largest sales, firm #2 is 
the second largest, etc. 
 














































1  0.6666     0.6666  0.222222     2.222e-1 
2 0.6357  0.2428   0.8785  0.172604  0.0294  2.948e-2 
3  0.6340 0.2326 0.0888 0.9555  0.170007 0.0231 0.0035 3.508e-3 
4  0.6339 0.2320 0.0851 0.9837  0.169881 0.0227 0.0030 4.533e-4 
5  0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9940  0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 7.086e-5 
6  0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9999  0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 9.88e-11 
7  0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9999  0.169873 0.0227 0.0030  0 
 
Even with no fixed costs and an infinite number of firms, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index is HHI = 0.464, which corresponds to between two and three firms of equal size.   
 



























1 0.1481      0.1481  0.1481 0.148197  0.29629651 
2  0.1097  7.159e-3  7.159e-3 0.1168  0.173219  0.29001881 
3  0.1077 5.377e-3 3.508e-4 3.508e-4 0.1135  0.175288  0.28878819 
4  0.1077 5.285e-3 3.096e-4 1.474e-5 0.1132  0.175483  0.28868321 
5  0.1077 5.281e-3 2.592e-4 8.44e-7  0.1132  0.175478  0.28867817 
6  0.1077 5.281e-3 2.589e-4 1.18e-14 0.1132  0.175478  0.28867799 
7  0.1077 5.281e-3 2.589e-4 0  0.1132  0.175478  0.28867799 
 
The market equilibria exhibit extreme inequality.  The ratio of outputs of 
consecutive firms is over 2.6.  Ratios of prices of consecutive firms is at least 7.  The 
ratio of profits of consecutive firms is about 20.  This means that a firm that has about 
38% of the sales of the immediately larger firm, can charge only 15% of the price of the 
                                                 
10   Both tables are from Economides and Flyer (1998).  The ith firm produces quantity qi at price pi , 
and firms are ordered in decreasing quantity so that q1 > q2 > q3 , etc. 
  13next larger firm, and receives only 5% of the profits of the immediately larger firm.  
Entry after the third firm has practically no influence on the output, prices, and profits of 
the top three firms as well as the consumers’ and producers’ surplus.  From the fourth one 
on, firms are so small that their entry hardly influences the market.  
 
 
3.3.5  Monopoly May Maximize Total Surplus 
 
Fifth, in industries with significant network externalities, under conditions of 
incompatibility between competing platforms, monopoly may maximize social surplus.  
This is because, when strong network effects are present, a very large market share of one 
platform creates significant network benefits for this platform, which contribute to large 
consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.  It is possible to have situations where a breakup of 
a monopoly into two competing firms of incompatible standards reduces rather than 
increases social surplus because network externalities benefits are reduced.  This is 
because de facto standardization is valuable, even if done by a monopolist. 
 
In the Economides-Flyer model, although consumers’ surplus is increasing in the 
number of active firms, total surplus is decreasing in the number of firms.  That is, the 
more firms in the market, the lower is total welfare.  This remarkable result comes from 
the fact that when there are fewer firms in the market there is more coordination and the 
network effects are larger.  As the number of firms decreases, the positive network effects 
increase more than the dead weight loss, so that total surplus is maximized in a 
monopoly!  Total surplus is highest while consumers’ surplus is lowest in a monopoly.  
This poses an interesting dilemma for antitrust authorities.  Should they intervene or not?  
In non-network industries, typically both consumers’ and total surplus are lowest in a 
monopoly.  In this network model, maximizing consumer’s surplus would imply 
minimizing total surplus.  
 
Compared to the market equilibrium under compatibility, the incompatibility 
equilibrium is deficient along many dimensions.  Consumers’ and total surplus are higher 
under compatibility; the profits of all except the highest production firm are higher under 
incompatibility; and prices are lower under compatibility except possibly in a duopoly. 
 
 
3.3.6  No Anti-Competitive Acts are Necessary to Create Market Inequality 
 
A sixth implication of network effects is that, because inequality is natural in the 
market structure of network industries, there should be no presumption that anti-
competitive actions are responsible for the creation of market share inequality or very 
high profitability of a top firm.  Thus, no anti-competitive acts are necessary to create this 
inequality.  The “but for” benchmark against which anti-competitive actions in network 
industries are to be judged should not be “perfect competition” but an environment of 
significant inequality and profits. 
 
 
  143.3.7  In Network Industries, Free Entry Does Not Lead to Perfect Competition 
 
A seventh implication of network effects is that, in network industries, free entry 
does not lead to perfect competition.  In a market with strong network effects, once few 
firms are in operation, the addition of new competitors, even under conditions of free 
entry, does not change the market structure in any significant way.  Although eliminating 
barriers to entry can encourage competition, the resulting competition may not 
significantly affect market structure.  This implies that, in markets with strong network 
effects, antitrust authorities may not be able to significantly affect market structure by 
eliminating barriers to entry.  See the earlier example where the addition of the fifth firm 
hardly changes the output of the first four firms. 
 
The remarkable property of the incompatibility equilibrium is the extreme 
inequality in market shares and profits that is sustained under conditions of free entry.  
Antitrust and competition law have placed a tremendous amount of hope on the ability of 
free entry to spur competition, reduce prices, and ultimately eliminate profits.  In network 
industries, free entry brings into the industry an infinity of firms, but it fails miserably to 
reduce inequality in market shares, prices and profits.  Entry does not eliminate the 
profits of the high production firms.  And, it is worth noting that, at the equilibrium of 
this market, there is no anti-competitive behavior.  Firms do not reach their high output 
and market domination by exclusion, coercion, tying, erecting barriers to entry, or any 
other anti-competitive behavior.  The extreme inequality is a natural feature of the market 
equilibrium. 
 
At the long run equilibrium of this model with free entry, an infinity of firms have 
entered yet the equilibrium is far from competitive.  No anti-competitive activity has led 
firms to this equilibrium.  Traditional antitrust intervention cannot accomplish anything 
because the conditions that such intervention seeks to establish already exist in this 
market.  Unfortunately, the desired competitive outcome is not. 
 
Can there be an improvement over the market incompatibility equilibrium?  Yes, 
a switch to the compatibility equilibrium which has higher consumers’ and total surpluses 
for any number of firms.  Is it within the scope of competition law to impose such a 
change?   It depends.  Firms may have a legally protected intellectual property right that 
arises from their creation of the design of the platform.  Only if anti-competitive behavior 
was involved, can the antitrust authorities clearly intervene. 
 
 
3.3.8  Imposing a “Competitive” Market Structure is Likely to Be 
Counterproductive 
 
The eighth implication of network effects is that antitrust interventions may be 
futile.  Because “winner takes most” is the natural equilibrium in these markets, 
attempting to superimpose a different market structure (say, one in which all firms have 
approximately equal market shares) may be both futile and counterproductive.   
 
  15 
3.3.9  Nature of Competition is Different in Network Industries 
 
A ninth implication of the network effects is that competition for the market takes 
precedence over competition in the market.  The fact that the natural equilibrium market 
structure in network industries is winner-take-most with very significant market 
inequality does not imply that competition is weak.  Competition on which firm will 
create the predominant (top) platform and reap most of the benefits is, in fact, often 
intense.  In network industries, there is typically an intense race to be the dominant firm.  
In network industries, we often observe Schumpeterian races for market dominance. 
 
    A good recent example of Schumpeterian competition is the competition among 
dot-coms in 1999-2000.  As explained earlier, economic models imply a high valuation 
of the dominant firm compared to other firms in the same network industry.  The same 
perception prevailed on Wall Street.  During that period, dot-com firms advertised very 
intensely and subsidized consumers so as to be able to achieve the coveted dominant 
position in the market.  The easy availability of capital for dot-coms at the time facilitated 
this behavior as firms “burned” almost all the cash they had in their attempts to get the 
top market share.  Many of the dot-coms failed because demand for their services was 
much lower than predicted or because of flaws in their business models.  However, all the 
successful dot-coms, such as eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo, also followed this strategy. 
 
  Generally, in network industries, the costs of entry may be higher, but the rewards 
of success may also be higher compared to non-network industries. 
 
 
3.3.10  Path Dependence  
 
A tenth implication of network effects is the importance of path-dependence.  
Path-dependence is the dependence of a system or network on past decisions of producers 
and consumers. For example, the price at which a VHS player can be sold today is path 
dependent because it depends on the number of VHS players sold earlier (the installed 
base of VHS players).  The existence of an installed base of consumers favors an 
incumbent.  However, competitors with significant product advantages or a better pricing 
strategy can overcome the advantage of an installed base. 
 
    For example, in the market for video players, VHS overcame Beta after six years 
of higher installed base by Beta.  This was an implication of  
(i)  Sony’s mistake in disregarding network externalities and not licensing the Beta 
format; 
(ii)  Matsushita’s widespread licensing of VHS; 
(iii)  The fact that one low-end, low-priced VHS player can contribute as much to the 
network effect as a high-end, high-priced Beta player. 
 
In the Beta/VHS case, it is clear that Sony mistakenly ignored the network effects 
that arose from the availability of rental tapes of pre-recorded movies.  The main function 
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recorded from the TV.  The pre-recorded market emerged later, first as a market where 
movies were sold, and later as a movies rental market.  The emergence of markets for 
“movies for sale” and “movies for rent,” which had to be recorded in a particular format, 
created a significant complementary good for Beta and VHS players.  The significant cost 
of physical distribution of tapes throughout the country and the costs of carrying a 
significant inventory of titles made the choice of what movies to bring and in what format 
crucially depended on present and forecasted demand.  This forecast was highly 
correlated with the present and forecast installed base of video players in each format.  
Thus, although network effects and path dependence played a crucial role in determining 
the fate of Beta, the outcome was far from predetermined.  Early, more aggressive 
licensing of the Beta format by Sony or the early promotion of low-end Beta players 




4.  Competition Policy Issues in Network Industries 
4.1  One-sided Bottlenecks 
 
Interconnection issues in telecommunications, railroads, airline, and other 
transportation networks are very common.  Often one company controls exclusively a 
part of the network, which is required by others to provide services.  We call this network 
part “a bottleneck.”  Generally, bottlenecks can be divided into two categories: one-sided 
and two-sided.  A one-sided bottleneck is monopolized by a firm and this firm does not 
require the use of a different bottleneck.  Such a bottleneck is shown as link AB in Figure 
5.  An example of such a bottleneck is the connection of local service 
telecommunications subscribers to a switch.  This is typically called “the last mile,” and 
often called “the local loop.”  After the 1984 breakup of AT&T, the local loop has been 
monopolized by the local exchange carrier, typically a Regional Bell Operating Company 
(“RBOC”) or GTE.  Excluding cellular phones, the local loop is a required input in the 
production of long distance services, and typically long distance companies do not have a 
comparable local loop. Similarly, such a one-way bottleneck can arise when a firm 
monopolizes a railroad track such as AB.  In telecommunications, the local exchange 
bottleneck has traditionally resulted in high prices for use of the bottleneck to originate 
(“access origination”) or terminate calls (“access termination”). 
 
 
                                                 
11   An often cited example on path dependence is the prevalence of the QWERTY keyboard despite 
claims of more efficient function by the alternative Dvorak keyboard.  For many business applications, and 
for antitrust purposes, the QWERTY example is not crucial because there was no significant strategic 
business interest in the success of either design.  There is also a factual dispute on whether the Dvorak 
keyboard was significantly more efficient than the QWERTY one. 
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Figure 5:  A one-sided bottleneck 
 
The potential anti-competitive consequences of a one-sided bottleneck are 
obvious, and have been understood since the early days of the telecommunications 
network when AT&T enjoyed a monopoly in long distance (say here AB) but faced 
competition in local markets.  In the context of Figure 5, the early AT&T was in 
possession of links 1 (long distance) and 2 (local), but did not allow an independent firm 
which possessed link 3 to interconnect at B and provide part of the long distance service 
CBA.  For over two decades in the beginning of the twentieth century, AT&T refused to 
interconnect independent local telecommunications companies to its long distance 
network, unless they became part of the Bell System, which essentially meant unless they 
were acquired.
12   
 
The early AT&T foreclosure of independents through a refusal to interconnect 
shows the importance of complementarities in networks and the way that companies can 
leverage dominance in one market to create dominance in a market for complementary 
goods, especially when the complementary good requires the monopolized input to 
provide a final service.  In this case, AT&T monopolized long distance and was able to 
leverage its position in long distance (through the refusal to interconnect with 
independent locals) and gain a dominant position in local telecommunications markets 
throughout the country. 
 
The continued foreclosure of the independents by AT&T and its “refusal to deal” 
with them caused regulation to be established at the State and Federal levels in the 
1930’s.  The 1934 Federal Communications Act (“1934 Act”) imposed mandatory 
interconnection in an attempt to stop the foreclosure of independents and stabilized the 
market share of local lines held by AT&T.  However, at that point AT&T’s market share 
of local lines had already reached close to the 89% that AT&T had in 1981, prior to the 
1982 agreement to be broken up.  
 
                                                 
12   AT&T claimed that the main reason for its refusal to interconnect was the low technical standards 
of the independents, as well as incompatibilities, that would jeopardize AT&T’s network after 
interconnection.  While there is some truth to those claims, it is unlikely that they applied to all 
independents.  Moreover, once acquired by AT&T, independents were interconnected with AT&T’s 
network, after some modifications.  This shows that the refusal to interconnect was mainly a strategic and 
commercial decision rather than a technical one. 
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Act”), mandates interconnection of all public switched telecommunications networks at 
any technically feasible point.  The 1996 Act and similar European Union regulations 
attempt to solve the problem of the monopolization of the key parts of local 
telecommunications network.  They impose unbundling of the network and forced leasing 
to entrants of some of the monopolized parts of the network, including the local loop.  
The goal is to make “mix and match” entry strategies feasible for local voice telephone 
service as well as broadband Internet access through digital subscriber lines (“DSL”) that 
utilizes high frequencies transmission though copper local loops.  Thus, they mandate 
access prices for unbundled parts of the network (unbundled network elements or 
“UNEs”) at cost-based prices.  The FCC and state PUCs accepted the view that lease 
prices should be based on forward-looking costs rather than on historical, accounting, or 
embedded costs (which was favored by RBOCs).  In setting prices for unbundled network 
elements, the FCC and state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) also rejected the 
relevance of prices based on private opportunity cost, such as the “Efficient Components 
Pricing Rule,” (“ECPR”).  Such rules derive prices for components from the monopoly 
prices of end-to-end services.  Thus, the ECPR and its varieties would guarantee the 
monopolist’s profits despite market structure changes in the markets for components that 
are used to create final services.
13  To prevent anti-competitive actions in 
telecommunications, the 1996 Act also imposes a number of rules, such as number 
portability, mandatory resale of services, transparency, non-discrimination, etc.  A full 
discussion of these rules can be found at Economides (1999).  Still, the 1996 Act missed 
opportunities to define technical standards and require technical compatibility of 
telecommunications equipment.   
 
Unfortunately, legal maneuvers by the incumbent local exchange carriers and 
high prices for the unbundled network elements considerably delayed very significant 
entry in local telecommunications markets. 
 
 
4.2  Two-Sided Bottlenecks 
 
In a two-sided bottleneck, each of two firms is a monopolist, each with a different 
bottleneck, and each firm requires the other’s bottleneck to produce its output.  For 
example, suppose there are two local telephone companies, each customer subscribes 
only to one local telephone company, and each company requires the other’s network to 
complete calls.  This could be represented in Figure 5 with the second link BC (number 
3) removed, and considering AB to belong to firm 1, BC to belong to firm 2, firm 1 
selling service ABC and firm 2 selling service CBA.  In the context of this example, each 
of firms 1 and 2 buys access termination from the other.  If each firm i =1, 2, sells both 
services ABC and CBA, then each firms buys both access origination and access 
termination from the other. 
 
Many of the issues of traditional bottlenecks have been dealt by regulation in the 
United States and the European Union.  In monopolized one-way bottlenecks, such as 
                                                 
13   See Economides and White (1995), and Economides (2003). 
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prices are regulated and there has been a tendency to decrease the regulated prices.  
However, prices are still high.  In the two-way bottleneck of access used in the creation 
of local calls by competing local exchange carriers, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(“1996 Act”) imposes cost-based reciprocal fees and allows the possibility of “bill and 
keep,” i.e., zero prices.  If cost- based reciprocal compensation were not the rule, and 
firms were able to set termination at profit maximizing levels, Economides, Lopomo and 
Woroch (1996a,b), have shown that a large network will try to impose very high 
termination charges on an opponent’s small network so that no calls terminate from the 
small network to the large one.  Without the possibility of such across-networks calls, a 
small network will only be able to provide within-network calls, and, being small, will be 
of little value to potential subscribers.  As a consequence, large networks are able to 
provide more value to subscribers, and the small network is foreclosed.  Starting from a 
regime of a large local incumbent and a small potential entrant, the large incumbent can 
set up termination access fees so that the entrant is kept out of the market.
14
 
In summary, in the absence of specific regulatory rules, two-sided bottlenecks can 
lead to foreclosure of competitors, even when each firm requires use of the bottleneck of 
the other to complete calls or provide a service. 
 
  
4.3  Market Power Creation Specific to Networks: The Importance of Technical 
Standards 
 
The example of early AT&T’s refusal to deal (interconnect) with independents 
(and with interconnected networks of independents) can also arise in milder terms when a 
firm X that has a significant position in its industry insists that firms that provide 
complementary products Y do not also provide them to X’s competitors.  For example, in 
the mid-1980s Nintendo refused to allow third party games (software) to play on its game 
console (hardware) unless the software manufacturers agreed not to write a similar game 
for competing game systems for two years.  Faced with this condition imposed by 
Nintendo, software developers had to make a choice to either write a game for Nintendo 
or for the competing platforms of Atari and Sega.  Clearly this restriction reduced the 
potential revenue of a game developer who would like, for a small additional cost, to port 
its game to the alternative systems.  But, also, more importantly, the restriction forced 
developers to predict which game system would have higher sales, and create software 
just for this system.  Thus, Nintendo used its dominance of the game market at that point 
in time to coerce developers to write software just for its platform, and thereby increased 
the value of the Nintendo virtual network (of hardware and software).  Nintendo 
abandoned this requirement under antitrust challenge. 
 
                                                 
14   This is not just a theoretical possibility.  Telecom New Zealand (“TNZ”), operating in an 
environment of weak antitrust and regulatory intervention (so called “light-handed regulation”), offered 
such high termination fees that the first entrant into local telecommunications, Clear, survives only by 
refusing to pay interconnection fees to TNZ, while the second entrant, BellSouth New Zealand exited the 
local telecommunications market. 
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network industry, restriction of the installed base of a firm in a network industry can be 
very detrimental.  It can push a firm to a lower rank with significantly lower profits, or, in 
extreme cases, push a firm to such a low market share that it has to close down because it 
cannot recover its fixed costs. 
 
Another example from the computing industry illustrates a situation of market 
power creation specific to networks.  Suppose that firm A chooses to make its product A 
incompatible with the products of other firms that perform similar functions, and it also 
subsidizes firms that produce complementary goods B to its product A.
15  Alternatively, 
we may assume that firm A subsidizes its own division that sells complementary goods 
B.  As a result 
(i)  the value of firm A’s product increases; 
(ii)  the entry hurdle of firm A’s rivals increases; 
(iii)  there is possible creation of market power. 
 
Firm A’s defense will be that its actions are pro-competitive since their primary 
cause is the enhancement of the value of product A.  From the point of view of A’s 
competitors, the actions of A look very much like anti-competitive behavior since the 
abundance of complementary goods B for product A puts them at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
 
Note that the existence of incompatibility is a necessary condition for possible 
creation of market power.  Moreover, the key to increasing social welfare is to move to 
compatibility.  That is, assuming that innovation and product availability would not be 
reduced, the best of all worlds is to have public standards and full compatibility.  
However, it is very difficult for US antitrust authorities to intervene and/or define 
standards. 
 
  Besides the use of technical standards, firms can also use bundling and other 
pricing strategies as well as non-price discrimination strategies to leverage market power 
across markets.   
 
4.4  Vertical Integration and Vertical Control Issues in Network Industries 
 
In networks, as in other settings, there are potentially anti-competitive issues 
arising from the possibility of vertical integration and the behavior of vertically integrated 
firms.  These may include, the bundling of components through vertical integration, 
contract, or manipulation of technical standards so that an entrant must enter both 
components markets even if it desires to enter only one of the markets.  Often firms have 
expertise or a technical advantage in only one component, and would like to enter only in 
the market for that component.  An incumbent can strategically alter the market 
environment through acquisition or contract so that the entrant can only be successful if it 
                                                 
15   For example, one can think of A as a computer operating system (“OS”), and B as an application.  
OS manufacturers can and do embed software routines that are useful to application software developers 
since they reduce the cost of writing applications. 
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also forces it to sell components where it does not have expertise.  Thus, it makes it more 
likely that entry will not occur.   
 
A vertically integrated firm can also use discrimination in price charged to a 
subsidiary compared to the price charged to a downstream competitor, or discrimination 
in quality provided to subsidiary compared to quality provided to a downstream 
competitor, that is, raising rivals’ costs.  These issues are discussed in more detail in 
Economides (1996b). 
 
  Firms in network industries can also use a variety of way to manipulate technical 
standards in joint ventures to achieve market power.  The issue of market power also 
arises in “aftermarkets,” where consumers are “locked in” to a service that arises out of 
commitments of a durable nature.  For example, in an important case that reached the 
Supreme Court, Kodak refused to supply parts to independent firms that serviced Kodak 
photocopiers.  Although one could argue that there was significant competition in the 
market for new photocopiers and Kodak did not have a dominant position in that market, 
once customers had bought a Kodak photocopier, they were “locked in,” and faced 
significant costs to buy a new photocopier of a different brand.  So, Kodak’s actions 
could be anti-competitive in the “aftermarket” for repair services of consumers who have 
already bought Kodak photocopiers.  A similar case of anti-competitive actions can be 
made in aftermarkets where consumers are locked-in by having made an investment in a 
durable good that is incompatible with other comparable durable goods, or are locked in 
other ways.  For example, consumers without number portability in wireless cellular and 
PCS markets may be “locked in” to the service of a particular provider or network.  
Similarly consumers can be “locked in” to the e-mail service of an Internet Service 
Provider (“ISP”) since there is no portability of e-mail addresses and many ISPs do not 
offer forwarding of incoming e-mail messages to another ISP. 
 
 
4.5  B2B and Other Exchanges Issues 
 
The world of business to business exchanges lacks the regulation of traditional 
financial and commodity exchanges.  Many proposed B2B exchanges are run by the 
firms that also are trading.  For example, ENRON was proud of the fact that it was 
participating as a trading party in B2B exchanges that it organized and ran.  Such a 
situation would be strictly prohibited in traditional financial and commodity exchanges 
because of the possibility that the organizer of the exchange would take advantage of the 
information created in the trading process to fashion privately beneficial trades.  In 
another example, COVISINT, an exchange for automobile parts organized by automobile 
manufacturers has been accused of acting to consolidate the monopsony power of car 
manufacturers.  In general, B2B exchanges can provide substantial benefits by 
consolidating trades, increasing market liquidity, improving standardization, and 
reducing search costs.
16   But B2B exchanges also have the potential of creating 
significant antitrust issues. 
                                                 
16   See Economides and Siow (1988) for a discussion of the benefits of B2B and other exchanges. 
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4.6  Dynamic Efficiency Issues 
 
The world of networks and dynamic effects brings to the forefront the fact that 
behavior that exhibits static efficiency may lack dynamic inter-temporal efficiency.  The 
possibility exists of a lock-in to a technology and a path which, when decisions are taken 
in every period, looks optimal given past decisions, but is sub-optimal if earlier 
investment decisions had been delayed and all the decisions were taken at once.  In a 
world with network effects a “lock in” to an inferior technology can easily occur as firms 
(and countries) find it more desirable to invest in the technology in which they already 
invested.  This can occur under perfect competition, but the problem can easily become 
much more important under oligopoly, as firms race to become dominant, given the 
importance of dominance in a network industry. With rapid technological change, firms in 
an oligopoly race for dominance can easily get stuck investing heavily in the currently best 
technology and unable to invest sufficiently in the next technology, thereby placing 
themselves off the optimal investment path. 
 
 
4.7  Innovation Issues 
 
An important antitrust issue is the speed of innovation in a network industry as 
affected by strategic decisions of firms and potentially anti-competitive actions.  The 
effects of actions on innovation are important because innovation affects the welfare of 
future consumers, and this should be taken into consideration in an antitrust decisions.  
The difficulty in dealing with innovation issues in antitrust arises from the fact that the 
efficiency and intensity of innovation in monopoly compared to perfect competition and 
oligopoly are open questions in economics.  Thus, it is very hard to make general 
statements on innovation in an antitrust context. 
 
 
4.8  Criteria to be Used for Antitrust Intervention in Network Industries 
 
When an antitrust intervention is considered in a network industry, a number of 
considerations that arise out of the nature of network industries have to be taken account.  
These are explained in detail in earlier sections, primarily in section 3.  First, the 
benchmark of the “but for” world that should be considered should be a network 
industries equilibrium with significant inequality, rather than a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium.  Second, competitors’ harm should not be a sufficient reason for 
intervention.  The right question is, “were consumers (past, present, future) harmed by 
specific actions?”  Third, uncertainty should be taken into account, and caution should be 
used in guessing how a high tech industry would have evolved but for the anti-
competitive action(s).  Fourth, it is possible that monopoly may maximize total surplus.  
Fifth, it will not be possible to sustain a long-term equilibrium with equal market shares, 
and a short term equilibrium with equal market shares may have low total surplus. Sixth, 
path dependence and the value of installed base are limited by Schumpeterian 
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in software industries, the extent and functionality of products is flexible.
17
  The definition 
of the market of a potential antitrust violation may be much harder. 
 
 
4.9  Criteria to be Used for Remedies 
 
When a remedies phase is reached, a liability finding has already been made.  The 
objective of remedies is to stop practices that were found to be illegal, prevent the 
recurrence of such practices, and restore any recurring threat posed by such practices.  
 
Any intervention by antitrust authorities creates a disruption in the workings of 
markets.  The objective of the remedial relief is to accomplish the objectives mentioned 
in the previous paragraph without damaging efficient production and competition in the 
market.  The potential damage that antitrust intervention can produce is larger when it is 
applied to an industry with fast technological change, where leaps to new and more 
efficient technologies are expected, while the specific nature of the future winning 
technology is unknown.  Often, it is difficult to predict future winning technologies, and 
therefore it is hard to fashion an antitrust remedy with an accurate prediction of its effect 
on industry structure and competition a few years down the road. Of course, this 
uncertainty is multiplied when the remedy creates a significant intervention in the 
industry. Therefore, lacking the knowledge of the effects of their actions, it is in the 
public interest that antitrust authorities and courts avoid extensive intervention in 
industries with fast technological change. It is best to intervene only to the extent that (i) 
intervention reverses the effects of actions for which liability was established; and (ii) the 
effects of the intervention are predictable.  
 
In markets with network effects, as I have explained in detail above, the existence 
of network effects has crucial implications on market structure and the ability of antitrust 
authorities to affect it.  In markets with strong network effects, even in the absence of 
anti-competitive acts, the existence of network effects in markets, results in significant 
inequalities in market shares and profits.  The resulting equilibrium market structure can 
be called a “natural oligopoly” where very few firms dominate the market.  The 
structural features of natural oligopoly for a software market cannot be altered by 
antitrust intervention without significant losses for society.  The very nature of markets 
with network effects implies that the ability of antitrust authorities to alter market 
structure in such industries is limited, as discussed above.   
 
As an alternative to antitrust and competition law, economic regulation can and 
has been established in three exceptional case: (i) for those markets where it is clear that 
competition cannot be achieved by market forces; (ii) where deviation from efficiency is 
deemed socially desirable; and (iii) where the social and private benefits are clearly 
different, since in each of these cases, it is clear that a market without intervention will 
                                                 
17   This can help an incumbent because it can expand the functionality of its product, but can also 
help its rivals as they may incorporate functionalities of the incumbent’s product in theirs. 
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would lead us to a detailed discussion of specific industries.  The requirements for case 
(iii) are typically met in many network industries, since expansion of the network creates 
network effects that are typically not fully internalized by markets.  However, it would be 
foolish to advocate regulation as the standard solution in network industries because of 
the existence of network effects.  Often, a much smaller intervention, such as 
subsidization of the network to help network effects will be enough. 
 
In case (i), where it is clear that competition and its benefits cannot be achieved 
by market forces, regulation may be a solution.  The significant advantage of industry-
specific regulation is that it can be tailored to the specifics of the industry, and specific 
rules on pricing and availability of particular products and services.  Regulators, such as 
the FCC also have staffs that can provide impartial technical advice that would be 
unavailable to a court.   
 
However, regulation has a number of drawbacks.  First, it is best suited for 
industries with well-defined and slow-changing products and services.  With stable 
product definitions, rules can be devised and specific pricing can be implemented if 
necessary.  Second, as a corollary to the first observation, regulation is not well suited in 
industries with rapid technological change and frequently changing product definitions.  
Moreover, in an industry with fast technical progress, regulation can be used by the 
regulated companies to keep prices relatively high, as exemplified by 
telecommunications regulation.  Third, often regulators are very close to the interests of 
the regulated parties rather than to the interests of the public.  Fourth, experience has 
shown that often regulators are not well informed about key variables as well as changes 
in the industry.  Fifth, regulators at both the state and federal levels are under pressure 
and influence by both the executive and the legislative part of government, and cannot be 
as impartial as a court.  Sixth, there is a tendency for regulators to expand their reach into 
related and new markets.  For example, the California Public Service Commission has 
recently asserted its authority over the Internet!
18  These drawbacks can create significant 
surplus loss due to regulation.   
 
In summary, regulation should be used sparingly in industries with stable 
products, if it is clear that antitrust has failed, and keeping in mind that regulation can 
also cause a significant surplus loss. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper is a start of an in-depth discussion of public policy in network 
industries.  I believe that it is fair to say that the legal system does not yet have a 
                                                 
18   The CPUC investigated the WorldCom-Sprint proposed merger in the context of the “transfer of 
licenses” to the merged entity. However, after the merger proposal was withdrawn by the parties, the CPUC 
continued to investigate the participation of these two firms on the Internet, and asserted its regulatory 
authority over the part of the Internet that is physically located in California. 
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large extent exemplified in United States v. Microsoft.  I will not go into the details of 
this case, but will use it as an example of a case that failed to create such a framework.
19
 
The Microsoft case has certainly been the most important antitrust case of the 
“new economy” this far.  Unfortunately, its legal battle was fought to a large extent 
without the use of the economics tools discussed above that are at the foundation of the 
new economy and were key to the business success of Microsoft.   There are a number of 
reasons for this.  First, often, legal cases are created and filed before an economist is 
found who will create the appropriate economic model to support the case.  Second, the 
economic theory of networks is so inadequate and unsettled that there is no commonly 
accepted body of knowledge on market structure with network externalities, based on 
which one could evaluate deviations toward anti-competitive behavior.  Third, the legal 
system has tremendous inertia to new ideas and models.  Fourth, the legal system is ill-
equipped to deal with complex technical matters.  Fifth, given all these facts, lawyers on 
both sides find it easier to fight the issues on well-trotted ground even if the problems are 
really of a different nature.  It is as if there is a dispute among two parties in the middle of 
a heavily forested area, but the lawyers of both parties fight it as if the dispute happened 
on the open plains, because they know the way disputes on the plains are resolved while 
the law of dispute resolution in forests has yet to be established.   
 
I hope that, with further academic analysis of antitrust issues, when the next major 
new economy antitrust case appears, there will be a deeper understanding and application 
of the economics of networks and of the way that the law should apply to network 
industries. 
                                                 
19   For a discussion of the Microsoft case, see Economides (2001a, 2001b, 2002) and 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/. 
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